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ABSTRACT
Mobile devices have access to personal, potentially sensitive data,
and there is a large number of mobile applications and third-party
libraries that transmit this information over the network to remote
servers (including app developer servers and third party servers).
In this paper, we are interested in better understanding of not just
the extent of personally identifiable information (PII) exposure, but
also its context (i.e., functionality of the app, destination server,
encryption used, etc.) and the risk perceived by mobile users today.
To that end we take two steps. First, we perform a measurement
study: we collect a new dataset via manual and automatic testing
and capture the exposure of 16 PII types from 400 most popular
Android apps. We analyze these exposures and provide insights
into the extent and patterns of mobile apps sharing PII, which can
be later used for prediction and prevention. Second, we perform
a user study with 220 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk:
we summarize the results of the measurement study in categories,
present them in a realistic context, and assess users’ understanding,
concern, and willingness to take action. To the best of our knowledge,
our user study is the first to collect and analyze user input in such
fine granularity and on actual (not just potential or permitted) privacy
exposures on mobile devices. Although many users did not initially
understand the full implications of their PII being exposed, after
being better informed through the study, they became appreciative
and interested in better privacy practices.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy→ Privacy protections; •Human-centered
computing→ Empirical studies in ubiquitous and mobile com-
puting; •Networks→ Network monitoring;
KEYWORDS
Privacy, Mobile Apps, Personal Identifiable Information (PII), Data
Analysis, User Survey
1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices have access to a wealth of personal, potentially
sensitive information and there is a growing number of applications
that access, process and transmit some of this information over the
network. Sometimes this is necessary for the intended operation
of the applications (e.g., location is needed by Google Maps) and
controllable (e.g., by the user through permissions), but for the most
part, users are not in control of their data today. Applications and
third party libraries routinely transmit user data to remote servers,
including application servers but also ad servers and trackers, and
users have typically limited visibility and understanding of what part
of their personal data is shared, with whom, and for what purpose.
With the increased interest in online privacy, there are several
bodies of related work. On one hand, a number of systems have
been proposed that improve data transparency and protect personally
identifiable information (PII). In general, these systems fall into
three categories: (i) static analysis and application re-writing [15,
18, 26], (ii) dynamic analysis with a modified or rooted OS [7, 16,
17, 41, 46], and (iii) VPN-based network monitoring [27, 30, 33, 35–
37, 39]. While these tools provide more fine-grained control over
sensitive data (as opposed to just permissions), the way users engage
with these privacy-preserving systems is less well studied. On the
other hand, in the human-computer interaction (HCI) community,
researchers have extensively studied how different designs for app
permissions affect users’ decisions on which apps to install and
which permission requests are considered legitimate by users [10,
19, 20, 22, 44]. A detailed review of related work is provided in
Section 2.
In this paper, we are interested in understanding privacy expo-
sures, which we define as PII transmitted by a mobile app (or third
party library used by the app) on the device, over the network inter-
face, towards a remote server. Our goal is to understand not only
the extent and mechanisms of PII exposure, but also its context
(i.e., functionality of the app, destination server, encryption used,
frequency, etc.) and the risk perceived by mobile users today. For
example, location needs to be shared for a navigation app to perform
its intended and legitimate function, and should not be of concern
to the user. In contrast, if the same navigation app uses a library
that shares device ids with a third-party server, this is more likely
a privacy leak1 and should be of concern to the user. We are also
interested in PII actually exposed in real network traffic, as opposed
to potential privacy exposures as captured by permissions. To that
end, we make the following two contributions.
Measurement Study. First, we utilize a state-of-the-art mobile
network monitoring tool, AntMonitor [36], to intercept and inspect
outgoing packets transmitted over the mobile device’s network inter-
face. Using AntMonitor, we conduct two extensive and systematic
experiments (one manual and one automated) on Android phones,
where we test 400 most popular Android apps (as of March 2017)
and we collect 47,076 outgoing packets. We identify whether these
1Most prior work [29, 33, 37] refers to PII found in outgoing packets as a “privacy
leak,” because PII is by definition private information and an outgoing packets indicates
exfiltration or a “leak.” However, we purposely distinguish between “privacy exposure”
(a PII contained in an outgoing packet) and “privacy leak” (which is an exposure that
is not necessary for the intended functionality of the app, and/or goes to a third party
server, or happens in clear text). This distinction, between a PII exposure and an actual
leak, can only be made based on the context, which is one of the main aspects we
investigate in this paper.
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packets contain any of 16 predefined types of PII (defined in Section
3.1), together with related information, which we collectively refer
to as context including: the destination server/domain (i.e., whether
it is an App Developer server or a third-party Advertisers & Ana-
lytics server), the app category (games, shopping, navigation etc.)
which reveals the intended functionality of the app, whether the PII
is exposed in clear text or is encrypted, and whether the app runs in
the background or foreground. Our datasets partly confirm findings
of previous measurement studies of mobile devices but are richer:
e.g., they contain previously unseen exposures over plain TCP and
UDP, exposures while the app is in the background, and malicious
scanning for rooted devices. We analyze our datasets and provide
insights into the extent and nature of how PII is exposed today. We
also identify behavioral patterns, such as communities of domains
and mobile apps involved in exposing private information. These
patterns can be used in the future to design automated prediction and
prevention methods. We plan to make the datasets available to the
community.
User Study. Second, we perform a user study on Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (MTurk) with 220 users. We summarize the results
of the measurement study in categories, present participants with
real-world scenarios of private information exposure in context (type
of PII, whether it is shared with the application or a third party, use
of encryption, etc.) and we ask them to assess the legitimacy (i.e.,
whether the information is needed for the app’s functionality) and
privacy risk posed. We also educate the participants on how a single
piece of PII can lead to even more information being discovered
when combined with data fetched from a data broker. Finally, we
ask users before and after the survey what actions they would be
willing to take to protect their privacy, including using free/paid
privacy-enhancing tools and contributing their data to crowdsourc-
ing. To the best of our knowledge, our user study is the first to collect
and analyze user input in such fine granularity (i.e., taking context
into account) and on actual (not just potential or permitted) privacy
exposures from mobile devices. We found that (i) many users did
not initially understand the full implications of their PII being ex-
posed but (ii) after being better informed through the study, they
became appreciative and interested in better privacy practices. The
insights gained by the study can inform the design of fine-grained
data transparency and privacy preserving tools such as AntMonitor
[2].
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2
reviews related work. Section 3 describes the measurement study,
including the data collection, summary and analysis. Section 4
presents the Amazon Mechanical Turk study, based on our datasets.
Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines directions for future
solutions based on the findings of this study.
2 RELATED WORK
Privacy-Preserving Tools. There are a number of complementary
frameworks, built by different communities, that can enhance data
transparency and privacy protection on mobile devices.
Permissions are the first line of defense against unwanted access
to sensitive resources. However, they are insufficient and too coarse-
grained: (i) users typically accept to install apps by default; (ii)
permissions do not capture run-time behavior; (iii) they do not
protect against inter-app communication and poorly documented
system calls; and (iv) permissions signify access to information,
which is less of a concern than sharing that information over the
network.
Static analysis and application re-writing, such as PiOS [15],
AndroidLeaks [18], and [26], suffer from the inherent imprecision
of decompilation. Furthermore, static analysis does not capture
representative run-time behavior and often fails to deal with native
or dynamically loaded code.
Dynamic analysis with a modified or rooted OS include Protect-
MyPrivacy [13], TaintDroid [16], and others [7, 10, 17, 41, 43,
46]. Such tools are powerful not suitable for mass adoption since
rooting a phone or installing a custom OS is not only a daunting task
for the average user, but is also strongly discouraged by wireless
providers and phone manufacturers.
VPN-based network monitoring tools use the TUN interface to
capture network packets on the device and detect whenever sensitive
information is sent over the networ. Over the years, their implementa-
tion has evolved from a client-server implementation [27, 33, 37] to
a mobile-only implementation [30, 36, 39]. State-of-the-art mobile-
only network monitoring tools include AntMonitor [36], Recon
[33], Lumen [31], and Privacy Guard [38]) and are amenable
to crowdsourcing thanks to their implementation as a mobile-only
user-space app. However, to the best of our knowledge, they have
been only used so far to collect packet traces and analyze “privacy
leaks” found therein, not for user studies.
Privacy “Leak” Datasets. The aforementioned tools have been
used before to collect datasets containing privacy “leaks” (see Foot-
note 1 for terminology) from mobile devices. Most closely related
to this paper, the VPN-based monitoring tools only used so far to
collect packet traces and analyze “privacy leaks” found therein, not
for user studies. Recon [33] collected packet traces to train machine
learning classifiers for predicting PII exposures. Razaghpanah et
al. [29] collected cases of PII exposures from thousands of users
using the Lumen app and used that data to find new advertising and
tracking services. Finally, the longitudinal study of PII exposures in
[32] demonstrates how privacy evolves across different app versions
in Android.
User Studies. Several experimental studies have analyzed mobile
app behavior and several users studies have analyzed user interac-
tions and mobile usage (e.g., Mehrotra et al. [25], Tian et al. [40],
EarlyBird [45] and Xu et al. [47]). Most closely related to this
paper, are user studies that focus specifically on privacy.
Permissions and how users interact with them have been exten-
sively studied in [10, 19, 20, 22, 23, 44]. Almuhimedi et al. [10]
studied how sending users privacy nudges affected their permission
settings. Wang et al. [44] studied user decisions when presented with
permission settings that are separated between apps and ad libraries.
More recently, Ismail et al. [19] showed that it is possible to maintain
app usability even when disallowing certain permissions. Chitkara
et al. proposed a retrofitted Android system, ProtectMyPrivacy
[13], that allows users to make fewer privacy decisions by setting
permissions based on third-party libraries instead of applications.
Taking a different approach, PrivacyStreams [21] proposes and
evaluates (with a user study) a tool for developers to write code in
a more privacy-preserving way. In the web ecosystem, the work
in [28] studies online privacy in websites to identify mismatched
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user expectations and the factors that impact these mismatches. The
work by Kleek et al. [42] is closest to our work in that they use
information captured from network monitoring to see if it influences
users’ decisions to install apps. Unlike their work, however, we are
interested in learning what users would do if given more fine-grained
control over their data.
Our work in perspective. In this paper, we use one of the
aforementioned state-of-the-art VPN-based monitoring tools, Ant-
Monitor [2, 36], to collect and analyze packet traces and the privacy
exposures found therein. This approach has the advantage that it
captures actual real-world privacy exposures, as opposed to e.g., po-
tential exposures described by permissions. In addition, we compile
the large volume of information from the packet traces and present
it to users in a way that they can process and assess. The combina-
tion of a measurement study (volume and coverage of packet traces
obtained through extensive and systematic experiments) with a user
study (summarizing the information into categories, defining context,
and obtaining fine-granularity feedback from users) is one of the
contributions of this paper, in addition to the detailed findings of
both studies as outlined in the introduction.
3 MEASUREMENT STUDY: DATA
COLLECTION & ANALYSIS
3.1 Data Collection System: AntShield
We are interested in collecting real-world cases of PII exposure, as
captured in packet traces of outgoing packets (as opposed to potential
exposures e.g., indicated by permissions). We focus on PII that have
been previously defined in related work (e.g., [30, 33]). Specifically,
we are interested in detecting PII that belong to the following list:
• Device Identifiers: IMEI, IMSI, Android ID, phone number,
serial number, ICCID, MAC Address, available through
Android APIs.
• User identifiers: usernames and passwords used to login to
various apps (unavailable through Android APIs); Adver-
tiser ID, email (available through Android).
• User demographic: first and last name, gender, zipcode,
city, etc. - unavailable through Android APIs.
• Location: latitude and longitude coordinates, available
through Android APIs.
To collect real cases of when the PII defined above are exposed,
we build on AntMonitor, an app that intercepts all network traffic
from the device without requiring rooting. We pick AntMonitor
since it is a representative VPN-based tool for privacy protection (see
Sec. 2) and it is easy to extend it for data collection. The traffic in-
terception, along with several utility functions of AntMonitor have
been made available as a library, and we will refer to it as the Ant-
Monitor Library [2, 36]. We will refer to our data collection app
that extends the AntMonitor Library, as AntShield [2, 34, 35].2
As shown in Fittg. 1(a), AntShield receives outgoing packets via
the PacketFilter interface provided by the AntMonitor Library.
Note that the AntMonitor Library also implements a TLS proxy,
which allows it to decrypt SSL/TLS traffic of applications that do not
2The design and performance evaluation of the AntShield system is a contribution
on its own. However, we consider it out of the scope of this paper. Here, we only
use AntShield as a tool to collect the packet traces that are the starting point of our
measurement and user studies.
PrivacyShield
Android Device
acceptIP
Datagram()
acceptDecrypted
SSLPacket()
Storage
JSON Files
Target 
Internet 
Host
AntMonitorLib
Packet-to-App 
Mapping
DPI Module
Packet Filter
Online Traffic
Offline Logs
Other 
Apps
Connector Type
Data Collector
JSON Object
App Name
PII
Packet Headers
Packet Data
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MapPacket()
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(a) AntShield Architecture. Data collection consists of the following steps: each packet
is intercepted by AntMonitor Library, searched for any PII, and mapped to an app
(b) PII, including those manually entered (name)
Figure 1: AntShield System used for Data Collection: Archi-
tecture and Screenshot.
use certificate pinning (see [36] for details). These decrypted packets
are also passed to AntShield via the PacketFilter interface. Each
intercepted packet (unencrypted or decrypted) is searched for PII
using the AntMonitor Library’s Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)
module. This module implements the Aho-Corasick search algo-
rithm to find multiple strings in one pass of a given packet. Some
of the PII defined above are available to all apps via Android APIs
and are thus easy to find in packets. To find PII that are unavailable
through APIs, we add them to the list of strings to search for using
AntShield’s GUI – see Fig. 1(b). Note that this methodology may
miss PII that are obfuscated by applications prior to transmission,
but as shown in [14] such behavior is rare. After DPI, we use the
3
AntMonitor Library’s mapPacket API call to note which app
was responsible for generating the outgoing packet in question. Fi-
nally, we break the packet into any relevant fields (destination IP
address/port, HTTP method, if applicable, and etc.) and save it in
JSON format. Any PII found is redacted before saving the packet
to allow us to share the data with the community. Any contextual
information (the PII found, along with the application name, and
whether or not this application was in the foreground when it gener-
ated the packet) is saved in separate JSON fields. Note that although
the entire packet is not necessary for the purposes of this paper, the
data could be useful later, for instance to train classifiers that predict
PII exposures as in [33] and [35].
In summary, using AntShield to capture packets on the device
has several advantages compared to previous datasets collected in the
middle of the network: (1) we are able to accurately map each packet
to the app that generated it; (2) we can keep track of foreground
vs. background apps, to see what kind of data apps send while in
the background; (3) we gain insight into TLS, UDP, and regular
TCP traffic, in addition to HTTP and HTTPS; (4) scrubbing PII and
labeling packets with the type of PII they contain is fully automated.
Due to these advantages, we were able to collect comprehensive and
realistic cases of PII exposures, as described in the next section.
3.2 Datasets Collected
Using AntShield’s packet capturing ability, we interacted with and
collected packet traces from 400 most popular free Android apps,
based on rankings in AppAnnie [3]. We used a Nexus 6 device for
our data collection, and collected two different datasets, depending
on how we interacted with apps, as described next. 3
Manual Testing. First, in order to capture PII exposures during
typical user behavior, we tested the top 100 apps in batches: we
installed 5 apps on the test device and then used AntShield to
intercept and log packets while interacting with each app for 5min.
After all apps in the batch were tested, we switched off the screen
and waited 5min to catch any packets sent in the background. Next,
we uninstalled each app and finally, turned off AntShield.
Automatic Testing. We also used the UI/Application Exerciser
Monkey [9] to automatically interact with apps. This does not capture
typical user behavior but enables extensive and stress testing of more
apps. We installed 4 batches of 100 applications each, and had
Monkey perform 1,000 random actions in each tested app while Ant-
Shield logged the generated traffic. At the end of each batch, we
switched off the screen of the test device and waited for 10min to
catch additional exposures sent in the background.
Summary. Since the two (Automatic and Manual) AntShield
Datasets capture different behaviors, we describe and analyze them
separately. The AntShield datasets are summarized in Table 1.
Other state-of-the-art datasets include Recon [33] and [32]. Our
datasets confirm and extend the findings of previous work, as out-
lined in the next section. Thus, in addition to being used to generate
survey questions in our user study (Sec. 4), our datasets provide
valuable insights on their own (Sec. 3.3), and we will make them
available to the community.
3These datasets are publicly available at [2].
Auto Manual
# of Apps 414 149
# of packets 21887 25189
# of destination domains 597 379
# of exposures detected 4760 3819
# of exposures in encrypted traffic 1513 1526
# of background exposures 2289 639
# of HTTP packets 13694 13648
# of HTTPS packets 6830 8103
# of TCP packets 867 2264
# of exposures in TCP (other ports) 38 7
# of UDP packets 496 1174
# of exposures in UDP 17 12
Table 1: Summary of Manual and Auto AntShield datasets col-
lected on the device.
3.3 PII Exposures Found in the Datasets
Our datasets provide us with insights into the current state of privacy
exposures in the Android ecosystem. Some of the captured patterns
were previously unknown, and are revealed for the first time here.
For example, we were able to detect exposures happening in the
background, exposures in plain TCP and UDP (not belonging to
HTTP(S) flows), and malicious scanning for rooted devices.
Background Exposures. AntShield is in a unique position to
capture exposures that happen in the background vs. foreground,
and other contextual information that is only available on the device.
Table 1 shows that there is a substantial number of background expo-
sures (e.g., half of all exposures in the automatic dataset) that should
be brought to users’ attention. Digging deeper, we found several
interesting patterns in apps that expose PII both in the background
and in the foreground. Fig. 2(a) shows how Flow Free, a puzzle
game behaves differently in the background vs. the foreground: in
the foreground several device identifiers are sent to ad and analytics
servers, and in the background, one of the ad servers (mopub.com)
also collects the user’s city. Perhaps this information is needed to
serve personalized ads based on the user’s location, but it is unclear
why it is needed when the application is in the background and
no ads are being shown. Another example is MeetMe, an app for
meeting people on-line, whose behavior is shown in Fig. 2(b). In
this case, the app collects less PII in the background, but is contact-
ing more ad servers. Such findings are concerning, since apps are
causing users data usage and are posing privacy risks even when the
user is not interacting with the app.
Non-HTTP Exposures. Prior state-of-the-art datasets [32, 33]
reported only HTTP(S) exposures. Table 1 reports, for the first time,
exposures in non-HTTP(S), including plain TCP or UDP packets.
Our dataset contains 29 UDP exposures, all of which were exposing
Advertiser ID and Location. As shown in Table 2, we also found
some apps (mostly games and photo-editing apps) that exposed the
Android ID over non-standard (80, 443, 53) TCP ports, such as 8080
or 10086 (a port known to be used by trojans, Syphillis and other
threats [8]). The destination IPs could not be resolved by DNS,
indicating that the application may have hard-coded those IPs.
HTTPS Exposures. Since the usage of encryption is increas-
ing, we also collected and analyzed PII sent over HTTPS. Table 3
summarizes the exposures we discovered in HTTPS traffic. The top
app com.ss.android.article.master is a news app, thus it makes
sense for it to query the user’s city, perhaps to fetch localized news.
However, it is unclear why the app needs the user’s IMEI (when it
4
App Name Leak Types Port
System IMEI, IMSI, AndroidId 8080
com.jb.gosms AndroidId 10086
com.jiubang.go.music AndroidId 10086
air.com.hypah.io.slither Username 10086
com.jb.emoji.gokeyboard AndroidId 10086
com.gau.go.launcherex AndroidId 10086
com.steam.photoeditor AndroidId 10086
com.jb.zcamera AndroidId 10086
com.flashlight.brightestflashlightpro AndroidId 10086
Domain Name Leak Types Port
206.191.155.105 Username 454
206.191.154.41 Username 454
23.236.120.208 AndroidId 10086
3g.cn IMEI, IMSI, AndroidId 8080
23.236.120.220 AndroidId 10086
Table 2: TCP packets (non HTTP/S) sending PII over ports other than 80, 443, 53
App Name PII Types # Exposures
com.ss.android.article.master City, Adid, Location, AndroidId, IMEI 752
com.cleanmaster.security Adid, AndroidId 174
com.paypal.android.p2pmobile City, FirstName, LastName, Zipcode,
Adid, SerialNumber, AndroidId, Pass-
word, Email
131
com.offerup Adid, Username, FirstName, Location,
Zipcode, AndroidId
114
com.cmcm.live Adid, AndroidId, Location, IMEI, Serial-
Number, IMSI
114
me.lyft.android City, FirstName, LastName, SerialNum-
ber, Zipcode, PhoneNumber, Location,
AndroidId
112
com.pinterest Adid, AndroidId 111
com.weather.Weather Adid, Location 110
com.qisiemoji.inputmethod Adid, IMEI, AndroidId 83
· · · · · · · · ·
All All 3039
Domain Name Leak Types # Exposures
mopub.com Adid 2380
isnssdk AndroidId, IMEI 805
roblox.com Location 679
applovin.com Adid 566
rbxcdn.com Location 561
appsflyer.com Adid 549
facebook.com Adid 391
bitmango.com Adid 371
goforandroid.com AndroidId 262
ihrhls.com Adid 219
pocketgems.com AndroidId 211
ksmobile.net SerialNumber, Location, AndroidId 159
tapjoy.com Adid, AndroidId 151
tapjoyads.com IMEI, AndroidId 147
wish.com Adid 139
paypal.com AndroidId 131
· · · · · · · · ·
All All 3039
Table 3: Summary of applications and domain names with HTTPS exposures in our dataset (manual and auto)
App Name Domain PII Types
com.bitstrips.imoji 10.2.32,
10.3.76
pushwoosh.com AndroidId
com.nianticlabs.pokemongo
0.57.4
upsight-api.com Location, AndroidId
com.psafe.msuite 3.11.6 ,
3.11.8
upsight-api.com AndroidId
com.yelp.android 9.5.1 bugsnag.com AndroidId
com.zeptolab.ctr.ads 2.8.0 onesignal.com AndroidId
com.namcobandai-
games.pacmantournaments
6.3.0
namcowireless.com AndroidId
com.huuuge.casino.slots
2.3.185
upsight-api.com AndroidId
com.cmplay.dancingline
1.1.1
pushwoosh.com AndroidId
Table 4: Applications with ”jailbroken” field
already has the Advertiser ID) and the specific longitude and latitude
coordinates of the user. In this case, the city is needed by the app, but
the IMEI and location coordinates are potentially privacy exposures.
Another example is com.cmcm.live - it exposes 5 different device
identifiers for no apparent reason. Hence, although well-behaving
apps should use HTTPS, they should also be inspected for potential
privacy exposures as not all information that they gather is neces-
sary for their functionality. We also found that the majority of top
domains receiving PII over HTTPS were ad-related. Although it
is expected for ad domains to receive the Advertiser ID, other PII
should not be collected. These findings motivated us to conduct the
user study in Sec. 4 to crowdsource answers to the question of when
a privacy exposure becomes a privacy leak.
Checking for Rooted Devices. We noticed a suspicious flag
called “jailbroken” or “device.jailbroken” exposed by several apps
(e.g., com.bitstrips.imoji, com.yelp.android, com.zeptolab.ctr.ads,
etc). This flag was found in the URI content or in the body of a POST
method in the packets, and it was set to 1 if the device was rooted,
or to 0 otherwise. In Table 4, we show the applications that contain
this field in our dataset and the domain to which the “jailbroken”
flag is being sent. We also show other types of exposures that the
particular domain collects. From the table, we see that the flag is
usually accompanied with a device identifier. Several apps send this
flag to the same domain (upsight-api.com, an ad network), which
indicates that an ad library is probably exposing this information,
rather than the app itself.
Behavioral Analysis of PII Exposures. An interesting direction
for analyzing the AntShield dataset is via behavioral analysis. For
instance, we can ask: (i) what can the communication between
mobile apps and destination domains reveal about tracking and
advertising? (ii) what type of information exposes to what domains
and how to define similarity of apps or domains with respect to
exposures? Fig. 34 showcases one graph that visualizes similar
destination domains with respect to exposures they received, as
captured in the AntShield dataset. We define two domains to be
similar if they are contacted by the same set of applications (see
the box on the right inside Fig. 3). For example, domains A and
B are similar because they are contacted by two apps (app1, app2).
We depict the similarity of domains A and B as an edge on the
graph of domains, at the bottom of the box. This data can be readily
4This figure was first presented in Fig. 3 of [35] and is repeated here for completeness.
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(b) MeetMe, an app for meeting people on-line contacts different domains with
different PII types depending on whether it is in the background or the foreground
Figure 2: Application behavior exposing PII, while running in
the background vs. toreground
extracted from our trace, together with the type of information that
was transmitted from apps to domains.
The graph depicted on the left side of Fig. 3 shows a projection of
the underlying bipartite graph (middle step in the box) on domains
(last step in the box); the graph is plotted and analyzed using Gephi
[12]. Nodes in this graph represent domains; the edges indicate simi-
lar nodes as per above definition; the width of the edge indicates the
number of common applications; and the domain color corresponds
to the type of exposed PII. The clusters of domains in the graph are
the output of a community detection algorithm, which is a heuristic
that tries to optimize modularity.5
Interesting patterns are revealed in Fig. 3. First, advertising is the
result of coordinated behavior. For example, it is easy to identify
ad exchanges: mopub.com is in the center of all communication;
and inner-active.mobi and nexage.com are also clearly shown as
hubs. All three large communities on the bottom and left of the
graph correspond to ad networks. Second, on the top left, there is a
community of domains that belong mostly to Google and Facebook,
and two domains (pof.com and plentyoffish.com) of a dating ser-
vice. The latter could be because the dating app also sends statistics
(e.g., for advertising purposes) to Google and Facebook, in addition
to its own servers, as suggested by the type of PII being sent (gen-
der and device ID, represented by the yellow color). Third, not all
domains belong to a community: some are well-behaved and are
contacted only by their own app. For instance the white-colored
domain zillow.com towards the bottom center of the graph is an
isolate node and only receives information about the user’s location,
which makes sense since it provides a real-estate service. Another
example is the blue-colored domain hbonow.com: it is only con-
tacted by its own app and only receives the Advertiser ID to serve
ads. Another observation from Figure 3 is that most domains in the
same community receive the same type of PII (as indicated by the
domain color). This can be explained by the common ad libraries
shared among different apps that fetch the same PII.
In general, similarity of apps and domains based on their PII
exposure found in their network activity can be exploited to detect
and prevent abusive behavior (e.g., advertising, tracking, or malware)
in mobile traffic. This is one promising direction for future work.
4 USER STUDY: MOBILE DATA PRIVACY IN
CONTEXT
In this section, we design a user study on Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) in order to assess user’s awareness and understanding of
mobile data exposure, as well as their level of concern and poten-
tial for adopting solutions. We use the datasets collected in the
measurement study in the previous section to present participants
with real-world scenarios of private information that was actually
exposed by mobile apps in our experiments. We present the user
with information about the types of PII exposed, as we as informa-
tion about the context this exposure occured, i.e., whether the PII is
shared with the application or a third party server; what was the app
category/intended functionality; whether it is shared in clear or en-
crypted text, etc. We then ask the users to assess the legitimacy (i.e.,
whether the information is needed for the app’s functionality) and
the risk posed by the particular PII type exposed in that particular
context. We also educate the participants on how a single piece of PII
can lead to even more information being discovered when combined
with data fetched from a data broker. Finally, we ask users before
and after the survey whether they would use privacy enhancing tools.
To the best of our knowledge, this user study is the first one that
5The main idea is that for specific node i , it tries to assign different communities
of its neighbors like node j’s community as i’s community and compute the gain of
modularity for whole network. The community which maximize the modularity will be
the proper one. If the gain of modularity be negative or zero, i keeps its community.
This process is an iterative process which is done for all nodes. This algorithm is
implemented in Gephi software [12], and works with weighted graphs also.
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Figure 3: Understanding the behavior of app that expose PII through graph analysis of the AntShield dataset. The graph consists
of nodes corresponding to destination domains and edges representing the similarity of two domains. Two domains are similar if
there are common apps that send packets with PII exposures to both domains; the more common apps expose PII to these domains,
the more similar they are, the larger the width of an edge between them. The color of a domain node indicates the types of PII
it receives. One can observe from the graph structure that domains form communities that capture interesting patterns: (1) The
large communities on the left and bottom consist mostly of ad networks; ad exchanges are nodes in between ad communities; (2)
Facebook/Google domains are a different community on their own, on the top left; (3) small apps contact only their own domain,
leading to isolate domain nodes; (4) domains in the same community receive the same type of PII (as indicated by the color of nodes).
collects and analyzes user input in such fine granularity (context)
and on actual (not just potential or permitted) privacy exposures at
large scale (as found in the packet traces of the measurement study).
Section 4.1 presents the design rationale and questions asked in the
MTurk study. Section 4.2 summarizes and analyzes the responses
from 220 participants.
4.1 User Study Design
MTurk Setup.6. We designed a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [1] and restricted it to workers
who are based in the U.S., are at least 18 years old, have completed
at least High School (in the US), and own a smartphone or a tablet
device. Our study was approved by the Institutional Review Board
(IRB) of our Institution (details are omitted from this double-blind
version). The workers were rewarded at a rate of $0.10 per minute
of their time – a standard followed in other studies [19, 22, 24]. We
allotted 30 minutes for the completion of our HIT, but the majority
of workers completed it within 13 minutes approximately. The
participants had to pass at least one of three attention check questions
in order to have their HIT approved and to receive the $3.00 payment.
6We went through the IRB process in our institution and obtained exempt research
registration HS# 2018-4272 “Amazon Mechanical Turk Survey on Mobile Data Privacy”
The HIT was open for 9 days in early May 2018. At the end, we
analyzed the responses of 220 workers that passed the attention test.
Demographic questions. First, we asked a set of demographic
questions, such as educational level, age, and employment sector
(tech vs. non-tech). We also asked what kind of mobile OS they
use and how many different apps they use daily. In addition to
these questions, we added three attention-check questions to prevent
workers from gaming the system by providing answers randomly.
We discard answers from participants that failed to correctly answer
all three attention check questions.
Categorization questions. The main goal of our study is to
learn how concerned are users about privacy exposures in different
contexts, defined as: the type of PII exposed, the app category,
whether the information was shared with a relevant application server
(thus may be useful for the functionality of the app) or third party
advertiser and analytics servers, and whether it is shared in plain
text or is encrypted. To that end, we first defined these terms and
categories as shown in Fig. 4.
First, we asked the participants how comfortable they are with
sharing various PII types with different types of remote servers, as
depicted in Fig. 5. Different PII types include: various device ids
(such as phone number, IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, Android Id, etc), user
ids (e.g., email, Advertiser Id, username and password), location
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(a) Definitions used to categorize a PII exposure.
(b) Definitions used to describe additional context of a PII exposure.
Figure 4: Terms defined before being used in the categorization tasks.
(GPS coordinates), and demographic information (e.g., gender, city,
zipcode, first and last name). Destination servers are roughly divided
into two categories: app developers vs. ad & analytics servers. The
rationale is that the application servers may need the PII to perform
their functionality (e.g., Google Maps clearly needs location) while
third party servers do not (thus causing more of a privacy leak rather
than an exposure). For each pair of (PII type, destination type)
we asked the participants to rate their comfort level of sharing that
PII type with that remote server, on a scale from 0 to 3; where 0
represents the least concern and 3 represents maximum concern (and
their willingness to pay for a privacy-preserving solution). See Fig.
5 for details.
Second, we asked participants to rate their concern in real-case
scenarios of PII exposures from our dataset (Sec. 3). For each packet
that contained a PII in our dataset, we considered a broader context
beyond just PII type and destination server type (i.e., application
server or ad/analytics server). We also considered the category of
the app (e.g., game vs navigation), whether the PII was encrypted or
sent in plain text, and the frequency of this PII being exposed by this
app category. The rationale is that the same PII type exposed may
be more or less concerning to users depending on the context. For
example, location exposed by a navigation app to that app’s server
in an encrypted packet is probably needed for the app to function,
while sending a user id to an unrelated third party (e.g., advertiser)
server, frequently and/or in plain text, is indeed a privacy leak.
A side benefit of the aforementioned categorization is that it
helped reduce the number of cases to be evaluated by users. Out of
8,579 exposures total (Table 1), 1,726 are unique when considering
the application responsible, the type of PII, the destination host, and
level of encryption. To further reduce the number of cases to label,
we grouped the applications based on their Google Play Store [5]
category and destination type (ad & analytics or not). To find ad &
analytics domains, we used the hpHost [6] list as it was found to be
the most comprehensive list for the mobile ecosystem to date [29].
These grouping reduced the total number of unique combinations to
256, which contained 23 unique Google Play Store categories (out
of 36 total). We split these combinations into five batches of HITs,
where each HIT contains five (or three for the last batch) categories
of apps to be labeled. To prepare the participants for the labeling task,
we first showed a “warm up” question (Fig. 6(a)) with a hypothetical
scenario of the Roblox app exposing certain PII and asked them to
assess the risk (Fig. 4(a)). Next, we asked the participants to label
the exposure scenarios for each of the five categories in their HIT –
example shown in Fig. 6(b). We also provide an example app out
of each category (from our actual dataset) along with a link to the
app’s Google Play Store page.
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10. Now consider different types of information available on your phone and shared by mobile apps with various servers. For each type of
private information below, please indicate how much you are concerned about it being shared (in a scale of 0-3), and what measure you would be willing
to take in order to protect your data. Enter:
• 0: if you are not concerned about sharing that private information with a remote server.
• 1: if you are concerned, but you wouldn't take any action to protect it from being shared with a remote server.
• 2: if you are concerned, and you would be interested in a free solution that would prevent your private information from being shared without your
consent.
• 3: if you are concerned and you would pay for a solution (if a free solution is not available) that would prevent your private information from being
shared without your consent.
Figure 5: Task to assess how comfortable users are with sharing certain PII type with certain type of remote server.
Assessing User Concern and Possible Actions. In order to as-
sess participants’ privacy awareness and understanding, we asked
another set of questions shown in Fig. 7. First, we asked the par-
ticipants how much they care about information being shared by
their mobile device (Fig. 7(a)) and what would they do in order to
better protect their information. Next, we asked if they would use an
app (e.g.,AntMonitor) that can prevent privacy exposures and how
much would they pay for such a service (Fig. 7(b)). It was our hope
that the categorization questions described previously would educate
users about mobile privacy and would make them more concerned
towards the end of the survey. To educate them further, we showed
them that a single PII in the hands of a data broker can help create
or lookup a user profile and can reveal much more information (Fig.
7(d)); the question was based on a real scenario where we fetched
data from a data broker based on a person’s email address. We then
asked them (if they would use a privacy app (and if they would pay
for it) to protect their privacy. Finally, we asked them if they would
contribute their mobile data to an app that crowdsources information,
train machine learning models and prevents privacy leaks (e.g., as in
Recon [33] and in [35]). In order to assess our hypothesis that users
became more privacy-aware after the categorization questions and
the data broker example, the same questions appeared twice during
the survey: once in the middle of the survey and once at the end.
4.2 User Study Results
In this section, we summarize and analyze the main results of our
user study. The main observation is that users seem initially confused
about the severity of PII shared in different contexts, but they are
interested in and are capable of being trained. Our main findings are
as follows:
• Users do not seem to understand how severe it is to share
certain PII types (especially device identifiers) with either
Advertisers or Developers. This may be because some
of these ids, such as Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, are
difficult to understand or relate to, yet they uniquely identify
the device and/or the user and hence should not be shared
with remote servers.
• As expected, users trust Application Developers more than
Advertisers & Analytics. However, some comments stated
that Developers are “a bunch of hackers behind servers,”
indicating possible confusion.
• Users also seem confused about sharing PII in plain text
vs. using encryption. Sharing PII in plain text is a bad
practice, since it exposes private information not only to
the destination servers but also to anyone that is sniffing
into the network.
• Towards the end of the study, most users seem to obtain a
much better understanding of mobile privacy. For example,
several comments state that users are grateful for our short
tutorial in mobile privacy. They are willing to educate them-
selves more in the future and to adopt data transparency
and privacy tools. These are encouraging results for future
work in developing privacy-enhancing technologies.
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9. Consider that you run the ROBLOX app on your smartphone. ROBLOX belongs to
app category GAME in GooglePlay. In our experiments, we noticed that this app sends your phone's GPS
location, in plain text and with high frequency, to both remote ROBLOX servers ("App Developer") and to
third-party Advertising and Analytics servers. This is summarized in the following table.
a)	Do	you	consider	the	sharing	of	location	with Advertising	&	Analytics	servers to	be...	(please	pick	one	option):
b)	Do	you	consider	the	sharing	of	location	with	App	Developer	to	be...	(please	pick	one	option):	
o Needed	by	the	App
o Not	Needed	by	the	App,	but	not	Harmful
o Not	Needed	by	the	App,	and	maybe	Harmful
o I	don’t	know/care.
o Needed	by	the	App
o Not	Needed	by	the	App,	but	not	Harmful
o Not	Needed	by	the	App,	and	maybe	Harmful
o I	don’t	know/care.
(a) Warm-up question with a hypothetical scenario of a particular example application –
the game Roblox.
14. Consider the Category: Game. Some example apps that belong to this category are: Baseball Boy!, Partymasters -
Fun Idle Game, Snake VS Block. Please evaluate each information type that is shared by the Game category in the
following table.
(b) Entire game category with real cases of PII types exposed and their broader context
(remote server type but also app category, encrypted/plain text, and frequency).
Figure 6: Task to assess user concern about privacy exposures
in context.
4.2.1 Summary and Demographic Info. We collected 223
responses, in total, on our MTurk survey. Since we posted multiple
HITs, each with different categorization questions (see Sec. 4.1),
some users completed more than one HIT, and there were a total of
151 unique participants. Two responses were discarded due to failing
the attention-check questions, and one worker was discarded due
to incomplete answers. This leaves a total of 220 valid responses,
which we analyze in the rest of the section. The majority of the
participants were between 25 and 34 years old, held a Bachelor’s
degree and were employed in a non-tech sector. 61.8% and 37.7% of
the workers were Android users, and iOS users, respectively. 118 of
our workers use six to ten different apps every day, 53 use between
11 and 20 apps, 41 use fewer than five apps, and only 8 use more
than 20 apps.
4.2.2 Categorization Results: Privacy Exposures in Con-
text. In this subsection, we provide the results we obtained by pro-
cessing user answers to the categorization questions (see Figures 5
and 6). We asked participants to rank the severity of PII exposures in
different contexts since whether or not an exposure is considered a
privacy leak depends on the context. There are four main dimensions
in each exposure: (i) its destination (app developers or advertisers),
(a) How much do users care about privacy?
(b) How much would users pay to protect their privacy?
(c) Would users contribute their data to a privacy app?
20.	 There	are	several	third-party	services	(data	brokers)	available	online	that	can	look	up	your	personal	information	based	on	
identifiers	such	as	your	email.	This	information	can	be	shared	with	advertisers,	trackers	or	anyone	using	the	services	of	those	
data	brokers.	Below	we	show	you	an	example	of	us	looking	up	one	email	on	such	a	website	and	getting	all	this	information	
back	in	return:
Now	that	you	know	this,	would	you	be	willing	to	use	an	app	that	protects	your	email	from	being	shared	with	advertisers	and	
third	parties?
• Yes,	I	would	use	it	for	free.
• Yes,	I	would	pay	to	use	it.
• No,	I	would	not	use	it.
• I	cannot	decide/need	more	information.
(d) Do users care more after being educated about data brokers?
Figure 7: Assessing users concern and potential actions. (a) Do
users care about privacy? What they are willing to do about it:
(c) share their data with a crowdsourcing system (b) use and/or
pay for a privacy app). And (d) do they change attitude after
being educated?
(ii) category of the app responsible, (iii) level of encryption used, (iv)
PII type. These dimensions play an important role in distinguishing
privacy leaks from exposures.
Figure 8(a) demonstrates the results when we asked the users how
concerned they are with sharing a certain information type with a
particular destination (Advertisers & Analytics or App Developer
servers), as shown previously in Fig. 5. In this task, we observe that
sharing all types of PII is concerning for our participants, regardless
of its destination, and they are willing to use a free app to protect
them. Furthermore, they would also pay for a tool that protects their
phone number and password from leaking to advertisers. As ex-
pected, participants are more concerned over their precise longitude
and latitude coordinates being shared as opposed to zipcode and
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(a) Rated by users
Concerned	and	would	pay	to	protect	it
Concerned	but	do	nothing	to	protect	it
Concerned	and	would	use	a	free	app	to	stop	it
Not	concerned
(b) Rated by us
Figure 8: How comfortable are users with sharing PII with advertisers and app developers? (a) Average rating of user responses to
categorization task of Fig. 5 (b) Recommended rating by us (“experts”).
city. Overall, our participants seem to trust developers more than
advertisers, which is not surprising.
In Fig. 8(b), we also provide our own “expert” rating for com-
parison. In particular, we would like to protect device identifiers
regardless of their destination, by using a paid solution if a free
version is not available. In contrast, our participants chose only to
protect their device identifiers with a free solution and they are not
willing to pay to protect them. Moreover, they give similar rating
to their location data regardless of the destination, although they
should be more careful with advertisers than developers, as there
are apps that need location in order to function. On the other hand,
Advertiser ID should not be protected as well as the other identifiers,
since this id is known by advertisers anyway.
Understanding whether PII is needed by the app. We ask
users to assess whether sharing a particular PII is legitimate and
needed for the functionality of the app (or more broadly by apps in
the same category), or if it is unnecessary and potentially harmful.
For example, GoogleMaps is an app in the Navigation category and
needs to share location to provide the service.
Fig. 9 presents a heatmap of the perceived severity of different
PII types per application category. The x-axis show the different PII
types and the y-axis contains the categories of apps responsible for
sending that PII over the network. The values and colors represent
the level of concern the participants have regarding each pair (cate-
gory, PII type): “not needed by the app and maybe harmful” (value
4 - dark color), “not needed by the app and not harmful” (value 3),
“needed by the app” (value 2), “don’t care” (value 1 - light color).
White color (or 0 value) represents missing combinations of PII
and category, that were not present in our datasets. In order to pro-
duce the heatmap, we consider the mean values of all participants’
answers.
For comparison, we also show a heatmap labeled by us to express
our “expert” opinion. First, location information (latitude and longi-
tude coordinates, zipcode, and city) should be available to system,
maps & navigation, weather, and travel & local categories only. All
the other categories do not need this kind of information for their
functionality and hence when apps transmit such data, it may be con-
sidered harmful. Second, user identifiers, such as email, password,
username, gender, etc. may be needed in some app categories (e.g.,
social, games, communication), but not in others (e.g., photography,
personalization, tools). Finally, device identifiers, such as IMEI,
IMSI, Serial Number, ICCID, and Android ID should not be used by
any app category, except perhaps for the System. These identifiers
are unique and can be used to track users across different apps and
build profiles, such as the one we showed in Fig 7(d). Furthermore,
Google explicitly discourages app developers from using these iden-
tifiers and asks them to instead create and use their own unique
identifiers within their app [4].
Comparing the two heatmaps in Fig. 9 reveals that users are not
as concerned about device identifiers as they should be: 32.6% of the
device identifiers per app category were categorized by workers as
“Not needed by the app and not harmful,” although they should only
be accessed by the System. However, other responses make sense:
app categories that should not require any information to function are
trusted the least (games, lifestyle, music & audio, personalization,
and tools), and categories such as weather and travel & local are
trusted with location information.
Understanding Encryption. We further split the heatmap in
Fig. 9 into Fig. 10(a) and Fig. 10(b), depending on whether the
unencrytetd packet containing the PII was unencrypted or encrypted,
respectively. Our heatmaps not only reveal participants’ opinions
about exposures, but also showed behavioral patterns of app cate-
gories. From Fig. 10(a), we see that the weather category does not
use encryption and sends Advertiser Id, Location and City to remote
servers in plain text. Similarly, maps & navigation category sends
Serial Number, Location, Zipcode and City information in plain text,
but encrypts the Android ID and Advertiser ID. Sending PII in plain
text is more harmful since this traffic can be sniffed. Unfortunately,
our MTurk participants did not seem to understand the implications
of transmitting data in plain text.
Understanding Destinations. We also split our heatmaps based
on whether the packet is going to App Developers (Fig. 11(b)) or
Advertiser & Analytics Servers (Fig. 11(a)). As expected, develop-
ers require more types of information in contrast to advertisers. On
the other hand, advertisers should ideally only require the Advertiser
ID, which is indeed fetched by almost every app category. However,
most of our participants indicated that none of the PII need to be
sent to advertisers for the app’s functionality (only 2 out of 31 val-
ues in Fig. 11(a) are below 2.5). This indicates that perhaps users
don’t consider ads being served a part of the app’s functionality. In
contrast, participants indicated more trust towards app developers
(Fig. 11(b)), which is expected as certain app categories require
PII to function correctly. For example, the following pairs of PII
and categories are expected: username for applications with logins
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users recommended
1:	I	don’t	know/care
4:	Not	needed	
and	maybe	
harmful
3:	Not	needed	
and	not	harmful
2:	Needed	by	
the	App
0:	Missing	
values
Figure 9: Heatmap severity of (PII type, app category). The darkness of the color indicates the perceived severity of the PII exposure:
the darkest corresponds to 4.0 (“Not needed by the app and maybe harmful”), while the lightest indicates 1.0 (“I don’t care”). Zeros
represent missing values for combinations we did not have in our datasets. We compare the average ratings among users who
answered that question (on the left column) vs. labeling recommended by us (on the right column).
Users Recommended
0:	Missing	
values
3:	Not	
needed	and	
not	harmful
2:	Needed	by	
the	App	
1:	I	don’t	
know/care
4:	Not	
needed
and	maybe	
harmful
(a) Exposures in plain text: Avg user rating vs. our recommended rating
0:	Missing	
values
3:	Not	
needed	and	
not	harmful
2:	Needed	by	
the	App	
1:	I	don’t	
know/care
4:	Not	
needed	and	
maybe	
harmful
(b) Exposures in encrypted traffic: average user rating
Figure 10: Heatmaps assessing the severity of exposures in encrypted vs. unencrypted packets, as assessed by users vs. us (“experts”).
(communication, games, and social), email for communication, and
location information for travel & local and maps & navigation. How-
ever, device identifies, such as IMEI, IMSI, Serial Number and
Android Id are not needed by any app category and they should not
be shared with advertisers nor developers. Our participants seem to
not understand this point and they labeled most of these exposures
as “Not needed and not harmful,” while in fact these ids are most
likely used for tracking. One interesting finding is that participants
showed more concern over their IMEI vs. other device identifiers.
This indicates that they may need more education about the other
device identifiers.
4.2.3 Towards A Solution: Tools Enhancing Data Trans-
parency and Privacy. Fig. 12(a) shows the distribution of answers
to the questions of Fig. 7, which essentially ask how much users
care about privacy exposures and what they are willing to do about
it. The overwhelming majority of users would like more control
over their information being shared, if a free option is available. Fig.
12(b) demonstrates what payment options users would prefer for a
privacy app: the majority would prefer a one-time fee between $1
and $5, than a subscription model. These results show that users
are not only interested in using privacy-preserving tools but are also
willing to pay for them. Towards the end of the study, after being
educated about the extent and severity of sharing PII, more users
were willing to pay for a privacy app, e.g., compare Fig. 12(a) to
Fig. 12(c). This demonstrates that although users may originally not
be aware or understand the risks of privacy exposures, they become
more weary after being educated about the occurrence and risks of
sharing PIIs (especially after learning the power of data brokers).
Finally, Fig. 12(d) shows the user’s willingness to contribute data
to a privacy-preserving tools that crowdsource information (such
as Lumen, Recon, AntMonitor) before and after completing our
survey. Once again, completing the study made users more open
towards using and helping a privacy-preserving app.
4.2.4 User Comments. At the end of the study, we asked
participants for their comments and suggestions; 99 out of 220 users
provided their feedback. In Fig. 13, we summarize the comments
of all workers in the form of a wordcloud. Overall, our MTurk
workers seemed satisfied with the survey and stated that it was an
educational experience. Most of the participants are thankful for
our short tutorial on mobile privacy, as they gained more knowledge
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(a) PII sent to Ad Servers.
1:	I	don’t	know/care
4:	Not	needed	
and	maybe	
harmful
3:	Not	needed	
and	not	harmful
2:	Needed	by	
the	App
0:	Missing	
values
(b) PII sent to Developer Servers.
Figure 11: Heatmaps assessing the severity of PII sent to differ-
ent destination: Third-party (Ad Servers) vs App Developers.
Assessed by users (average user rating shown). The darker the
color the more concerned the users).
about privacy and how different apps share their information with
various destinations. At the end of the survey, they seem more
concerned about privacy and interested in a solution, including a
privacy app free or paid; see Fig. 12. Several participants mentioned
the recent Facebook and Cambridge Analytica scandal and wondered
if our user survey was inspired by it (it was not!). Below, we provide
a sample of representative user comments, out of 99 total comments,
grouped by two recurrent topics.
They learned a lot:
“I liked this. Was this all due to what is going on
with Facebook and other privacy concerns?”
“I enjoyed taking this survey. I would not share
my information with anyone that would use the
information in anyway that would be damaging to
my life. Right now I am getting phone calls I don’t
want. I would pay to have those stopped.”
“I definitely became more concerned about how
much data is taken. You don’t realize how much
(a) How much users care about privacy
exposures.
(b) Monetization question at the begin-
ning of the study.
(c) Monetization question at the end of
the study.
(d) Data contribution in the beginning vs.
at the end of study
Figure 12: Answers to questions of Fig. 7: how much do users
care about mobile privacy and what they are willing to do to
protect it? Some questions are purposely repeated in the begin-
ning and at the end of the study.
of your personal data is sent to advertisers and it
makes you more weary of downloading and using
certain apps.”
“I thought it was quite enlightening. I will cer-
tainly be paying more attention to what and how
an app uses my data in the future.”
“I definitely became more concerned about my
privacy. Thank you for the wake up call.”
“Good Study. Made me really think about how
much of everybody’s information is really out there.”
“I am surprised to learn how much information
could be linked to my email address. It is like
telemarketing on steroids and I would be willing
to keep that info private I think we should always
have the option to keep our private info private.”
“I have become a little more concerned about my
privacy as some of this was new information to
me. I will definitely be doing more research on
this subject in the near future. Thank you for the
informative study! Everything was very clear and
straight forward, I appreciate the opportunity to
13
Figure 13: Overview of main keywords extracted from 99
MTurk workers’ comments
participate.”
They are interested in using a privacy-enhancing
solution:
“I did not know all of that and if you developed a
product I want it.”
“Yes - I have been concerned, but it has been diffi-
cult to know where to start with securing my data.
I live in the US, so there is no GDPR to protect
me, however I feel I can review application re-
quests for information in a more informed manner.
I would also love to find the service you mentioned
about protecting privacy of data.”
“Thank you. I learned a lot from this study. I hope
you are able to develop something that can help
protect consumers and still allow developers to
flurish.”
“I would love a reliable app that limited/reduced
data collection and increased privacy. Problem is
that it’s not possible to know which privacy apps
are reliable and effective, while still allowing a
service or app to be used. Even a reliable, main-
stream email alternative would be good!”
5 CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We provided a combination of a measurement and a user study of
actual PII exposed by mobile apps. We also defined and analyzed
the context (PII type, destination domain, app category/functionality,
background/foreground, use of encryption vs. plain text) where these
PII exposures occur, and we distinguished between PII exposure
and PII leak (which is more likely to be harmful) depending on the
context. In the measurement study, we collected and analyzed a new
richer dataset, which reveals interesting PII exposures and patterns,
some of which were previously unknown. Preliminary graph analy-
sis revealed interesting patterns of apps and domains colluding to
expose private information. In the user study, we compiled the large
amount of information from the measurement study into a smaller
number of categories (contexts) and we asked users to assess the
privacy exposures in the actual context they appeared, w.r.t. their
legitimacy and risk they pose. Most users were initially unaware of
the severity and potential implications of PII exposures: they could
not identify the most critical PII or context (e.g., that it may be ok to
share information with the application server instead of third parties,
such as advertises and trackers). However, they seemed to appreciate
the information they got through the study, which made them more
willing to adopt privacy enhancing tools. Our analysis combines
the scale and coverage of the network-based measurement study
with the fine-granularity user input assessing privacy exposures in
context.
There are several directions for future work, building on the
observations of this paper. First, the behavioral analysis of PII
leaks at the end of Section 3 revealed similarities in the way apps
and destination domains extract PII from mobile devices. Those
observations can be further exploited to design machine learning
approaches that can detect packets with potential privacy exposures
[11, 34], further inspect them and eventually prevent an actual leak
(e.g., by using real-time tools like AntMonitor to block a packet
or obfuscate a PII). Second, the user study showed that users are
interested in and are capable of being educated about their data, and
they want to adopt better privacy practices and new tools (such as
AntMonitor, Recon or Lumen) to enhance data transparency and
privacy control.
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